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Abstract
We propose steganographic systems for the case when covertexts (containers)
are generated by a finite-memory source with possibly unknown statistics. The
probability distributions of covertexts with and without hidden information are
the same; this means that the proposed stegosystems are perfectly secure, i.e.
an observer cannot determine whether hidden information is being transmitted.
The speed of transmission of hidden information can be made arbitrary close
to the theoretical limit — the Shannon entropy of the source of covertexts. An
interesting feature of the suggested stegosystems is that they do not require any
(secret or public) key.
At the same time, we outline some principled computational limitations
on steganography. We show that there are such sources of covertexts, that any
stegosystem that has linear (in the length of the covertext) speed of transmission
of hidden text must have an exponential Kolmogorov complexity. This shows,
in particular, that some assumptions on the sources of covertext are necessary.
Keywords: Steganography, Kolmogorov complexity, Information Theory,
Shannon entropy.
1. Introduction
In this work we take an information-theoretic approach to steganography,
and construct perfectly secure steganographic systems for the case of finite-
memory sources of covertext. We also show that some (probabilistic) assump-
tions on the sources of covertexts are necessary, by demonstrating some prin-
cipled computational limitations on steganography that arise in the absence of
such assumptions.
Perhaps the first information–theoretic approach to steganography was pro-
posed by Cachin [1], who modeled the sequence of covertext by a memoryless
distribution. Besides laying out basic definitions of steganographic protocols
and their security, Cachin has constructed a steganographic protocol, which,
relying on the fact that the probability distribution of covertexts is known, as-
sures that the distributions of covertexts with and without hidden information
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are statistically close (but, in general, are not equal). For the case of an un-
known distribution, a universal (distribution–free) steganographic system was
proposed, in which this property holds only asymptotically with the size of the
hidden message going to infinity. Distribution-free stegosystems are of particular
practical importance, since in reality covertexts can be a sequence of graphical
images, instant or email messages, that is, sources for which the distribution
is not only unknown but perhaps cannot be reasonably approximated. Cachin
has also defined perfectly secure steganographic systems as those for which the
probability distribution of covertexts with and without hidden information are
the same.
In [12] a perfectly secure universal (that is, distribution-free) steganographic
system was proposed, for the case of i.i.d. sources of covertexts. Here we gen-
eralize this construction, obtaining a perfectly secure universal steganographic
system for a much larger class of sources covertext: that of all k-order Markov
sources. The only probabilistic characteristic of the source that has to be known
is the bound k on the memory.
For any stegosystem the next property after its security that is of interest
is its capacity. The capacity of a stegosystem can be defined as the number of
hidden bits transmitted per letter of covertext. We show that our stegosystem
has the maximal possible capacity: the number of hidden bits per covertext
approaches (with the length of the block growing) the Shannon entropy of the
source of covertexts.
Another important feature of our stegosystems is that they do not require
a secret key. Thus, the constructions presented demonstrate that in order to
achieve perfect steganographic security no secret has to be shared between the
communicating parties. Clearly, in this case Eve (the observer) can retrieve the
secret message being transmitted; however, she will not be able to say whether
it is a secret message or a random noise. This property of our stegosystems (as
indeed their secrecy) relies on the fact that the secret message transmitted is in-
distinguishable from a Bernoulli (i.i.d.) sequence of equiprobable bits (random
noise). This is a standard assumption that can be easily fulfilled if Alice uses
the Vernam cipher (a one-time pad) to encode the secret before transmitting.
For this, obviously, a cryptographic key is required. In other words, a secret key
can be used to obtain cryptographic security, but it is not required to obtain
steganographic security, as long as the hidden information is already indistin-
guishable from random noise. This also means that the proposed stegosystems
can be directly applied for covert public-key cryptographic communication.
The main idea behind the stegosystems we propose is the following. Suppose
that for a covertext x generated by a source, we can find a set S of covertexts
such that each covertext in S has the same probability of being generated as x.
Moreover, assume that each element of S defines S uniquely. Then, instead of
transmitting the covertext x that was actually generated, we can transmit the
covertext in the set S whose number in S (assuming some pre-defined natural
ordering) corresponds to the secret text we want to pass. This does not change
the probabilistic characteristics of the source, provided the secret text consists
of i.i.d. equiprobable bits. Therefore, an observer cannot tell whether secret
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information is being passed. Consider a simple example. Suppose that Alice
wants to pass a single bit, and assume that the source of covertexts is i.i.d., but
its distribution is unknown. Alice reads two symbols from the source, say ab.
She knows that (since the source is i.i.d.) the probability of ba is the same. So
if Alice’s secret bit to pass is 0 she transmits ab and if she needs to pass 1 then
she transmits ba. However, if the source has generated aa then Alice cannot
pass her secret bit, but she has to transmit aa anyway, to preserve the proba-
bilistic characteristics of the source. (This example is considered in more details
in Section 3.) The same idea was used by von Neumann [17] in his method of
extracting random equiprobable bits from a source of i.i.d. (but not necessarily
equiprobable) symbols. There are two disadvantages of the outlined stegosys-
tem: first, the rate of transmission of secret text is not optimal, and second, it
applies only to i.i.d. covertexts. The following generalization surmounts both
obstacles. First, observe that for a sequence of symbols of length n output by an
i.i.d. source (with unknown characteristics), all permutations of this sequence
have the same probability. To pass secret information, Alice transmits the per-
muted sequence whose index number (in the set of all permutations) encodes
her message. A stegosystem based on this principle achieves (asymptotically
with the block length n growing) maximal possible rate of transmission of hid-
den text: the Shannon entropy of the source of covertexts. Moreover, this idea
works far beyond i.i.d. sources of covertexts, by passing from all permutations
of a string of covertexts, to the set of strings that have the same frequency of oc-
currence of all tuples of a given length. This way we can construct a stegosystem
for k-order Markovian sources (for any given k).
Thus, we will show that there is a wide class of sources of covertexts, for
which simple, perfectly secure steganographic systems exist. Naturally, one is
interested in the question of whether such stegosystems exist for any possible
(stationary) source of covertext. This problem is of interest since sources of
covertexts that are of particular practical importance, such as texts in natu-
ral languages or photographs, do not seem to be well-described by any known
simple model (in particular, the finite-memory assumption is often violated).
Here we answer this question in the negative. More precisely, we demonstrate
that there exist such sets of distributions on covertexts of length n, for which
simple stegosystems whose speed of transmission of hidden text Ω(n) do not
exist. Here simplicity is measured by Kolmogorov complexity of the system,
and stegosystem is considered “simple” when its complexity is exp(o(n)), when
n goes to infinity. Kolmogorov complexity is an intuitive notion which often
helps to establish first results that help to understand the principled limitations
a certain problem or model imposes; it has been used as such in many works,
see, for example, [6, 15, 16, 18].
This result can be interpreted as that there are such complicated sources
of data that one cannot conceivably put significantly more information into
a source without changing its characteristics, even though the entropy of the
source is very high. This seems to reflect what is well-known in practice; to
take one example, it is apparently very hard to put any hidden message into
a given text in a natural language, without making the text “unnatural.” Of
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course, rather than trying to change a given text, the communicating parties
can easily agree in advance on two texts each of which codes one secret bit,
so that when the need for communication arises, Alice can transmit one of the
texts, thereby passing one bit. However, in order to communicate more than one
bit, to use the same method they would have to have a database of covertexts
that is exponentially large with respect to the message to pass. Moreover, even
this stegosystem would not be perfectly secure, since the source of covertexts
with hidden information is concentrated on a small subset of all the possible
covertexts of given length. If the stegosystem is used once, then perhaps no
reliable detection of the hidden message is possible. If it is to be used on multiple
occasions, that is, if we wish to construct a general purpose stegosystem for
transmitting, say, δn bits with an n-bit message (for some fixed δ > 0), we will
need to construct a database of effectively all possible covertexts. At least, this
is the case for some sources of covertexts, as we demonstrate here, and it seems
likely that it is the case for such sources as texts in natural languages or even
photographic images. Thus, our negative result may be helpful in clarifying
the nature of the difficulties that arise in construction of real steganographic
systems which use human-generated sources of covertexts.
Contents. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we present the basic definitions. In Section 3 we present a (perfectly secure)
stegosystem for finite-memory source of covertexts, which has the mentioned
asymptotic properties of the rates of hidden text transmission; this stegosystem
is a generalization of the stegosystem for i.i.d. sources of covertexts described
in [11, 12]. In Section 3.2 we briefly describe how this stegosystem can be
algorithmically realized in practice. In Section 4 we present a result of the
opposite kind: there are sources of covertexts that are so complex that any
stegosystem that has a linear speed of transmission, must have an exponential
Kolmogorov complexity.
2. Notation and definitions
We use the following model for steganography, mainly following [1]. It is
assumed that Alice has an access to an oracle which generates covertexts ac-
cording to some fixed but unknown distribution of covertexts µ. Covertexts
belong to some (possibly infinite) alphabet A. Alice wants to use this source
for transmitting hidden messages. It is assumed that Alice does not know the
distribution of covertexts generated by the oracle, but this distribution is either
memoryless or has a finite memory (or order); moreover, a bound on the mem-
ory of the source of covertexts is known to all the parties (and is used in the
stegosystems as a parameter).
A hidden message is a sequence of letters from B = {0, 1} generated inde-
pendently with equal probabilities of 0 and 1. We denote the source of hidden
messages by ω. This is a commonly used model for the source of secret mes-
sages, since it is assumed that secret messages are encrypted by Alice using a
key shared only with Bob. If Alice uses the Vernam cipher (a one-time pad)
then the encrypted messages are indeed generated according to the Bernoulli
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1/2 distribution, whereas if Alice uses modern block or stream ciphers the en-
crypted sequence “looks like” a sequence of random Bernoulli 1/2 trials. (Here
“looks like” means indistinguishable in polynomial time, or that the likeness is
confirmed experimentally by statistical data, see, e.g. [8, 10].) The third party,
Eve, is a passive adversary: Eve is reading all messages passed from Alice to
Bob and is trying to determine whether secret messages are being passed in the
covertexts or not. Clearly, if covertexts with and without hidden information
have the same probability distribution (µ) then it is impossible to distinguish
them. Finite groups of (covertext, hidden, secret) letters are sometimes called
(covertext, hidden, secret) words. Elements of A (B) are usually denoted by x
(y).
The steganographic protocol can be summarized in the following definition.
Definition 1 (steganographic protocol). Alice draws a sequence of cover-
texts x∗ = x1, x2, . . . generated by a source of covertexts µ, where xi, i ∈ N
belong to some (finite or infinite) alphabet A.
Alice has a sequence y∗ = y1, y2, . . . of secret text generated by a source ω
of i.i.d. equiprobable bits yi: ω(yi = 0) = ω(yi = 1) = 1/2, independently for all
i ∈ N. The sources µ and ω are assumed independent.
A stegosystem St is a pair of functions: an encoder and a decoder. The
encoder StEnc is a function from An×{0, 1}∗ (a block of covertexts and a secret
sequence) to An, where n ∈ N is a parameter (the block length), whose value
is known to all parties (including Eve). The decoder StDec is a function from
An to {0, 1}∗. Moreover, StDec(StEnc(x, y)) = y for all (x, y) ∈ An × {0, 1}∗
for which StEnc(x, y) is defined (that is, decoding is performed without
errors). It is assumed that Stn(x, t) can be undefined for some values of (x, t) ∈
An×{0, 1}∗, the interpretation being that Alice can chose how many secret bits
she can transmit based on the covertext x and the secret text y∗, and that she
always has more secret bits than she can transmit.
From x∗ and y∗ Alice, using a stegosystem St obtains a steganographic
sequence X = X1, X2, . . . that is transmitted over a public channel to Bob.
Bob (and any possible observer Eve) receives X and obtains, using the decoder
StDec(X), the resulting sequence y∗.
The speed of transmission of secret text Ln is defined as the expected
(with respect to the sources of covertexts x∗ and secret bits y1, y2, . . . ) average
(per letter of covertext) length of the secret message that is transmitted
Ln(St) :=
1
n
Eµ×ωmax{k ∈ {0} ∪ N : StEnc(x1 . . . xn, y1..yk) is defined} (1)
For the convenience of notation, the definition is presented in terms of an
infinite sequence of secret text. It means that a stegosystem can use as many or
as few bits of the hidden text for transmission in a given block as is needed. In
practice, of course, Alice has only a finite sequence to pass, which may result in
that she will run out of secret bits when transmitting the last block of covertexts.
In this case we assume that the end of each message can always be determined
(e.g. there is always an encrypted “end of message” sign in the end), so that
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Alice can fill up the remainder with random noise. The sequence of covertexts
obtained from the source is routinely broken into blocks of size n, when n is
the parameter of the stegosystem. For comparison, in the simple stegosystem
presented in the beginning of this section we had n = 2.
Observe that we require by definition of a steganographic system that the
decoding is always correct. Moreover, we do not consider noisy channels or
active adversaries, so that Bob always receives what Alice has transmitted.
Note also that there is no secret key in the protocol. A secret key may or may
not be used before entering into the steganographic communication in order to
obtain the hidden sequence x∗; however, this is out of scope of the protocol.
Definition 2 (perfect security). A steganographic system is called (perfectly)
secure if the sequence of covertexts x∗ and the steganographic sequence X have
the same distribution: Pr(x1, . . . , xn ∈ C) = Pr(X1, . . . , Xn ∈ C) for any
(measurable) C ⊂ An and any n ∈ N, where the probability is taken with respect
to all distributions involved: µ and ω.
3. A universal stegosystem for k-order Markov sources
Before presenting the stegosystem for k-order Markov sources, we give an
example of a very simple stegosystem for i.i.d. sources. This stegosystem demon-
strates in a most concise way the main ideas used then in the general construc-
tion.
Consider a situation in which the source of covertexts µ generates i.i.d. sym-
bols from the alphabet A = {a1, a2, a3}. Let, for example,
y∗ = 01100 . . . , x∗ = a1a1 a2a3 a3a3 a1a3 a2a2 a2a1 a2a1 a3a2 . . . , (2)
where y∗ was generated by ω and x∗ is a sequence of covertexts generated by
µ. (Spaces between pairs of letters are introduced to facilitate the reading.)
The symbols of x∗ are grouped into pairs (thus, the block length n equals
2 in this example), which are processed sequentially as follows. If the current
pair is aiai, where i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then this pair is transmitted unchanged to Bob,
and no secret information is transmitted with it. If the current pair is aiaj with
i 6= j then Alice transmits this pair ordered lexicographically (that is, ordered
with respect to the ordering a1 < a2 < a3) if the secret bit to transmit is 0, and
she transmits this pair ordered reverse-lexicographically if the secret bit is 1.
In other words, in the case i 6= j Alice transmits a pair of symbols selected as
follows:
y = 0 y = 1
i < j aiaj ajai
i > j ajai aiaj
In our example, the sequence (2) is transmitted as
X = a1a1 a2a3 a3a3 a3a1 a2a2 a2a1 a1a2 a2a3 . . .
Decoding is obvious: Bob groups the symbols of X into pairs, ignores all occur-
rences of aiai, and changes aiaj to 0 if i < j and to 1 otherwise.
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Proposition 1. Suppose that a source µ generates i.i.d. random variables
taking values in A = {a1, a2, a3} and let this source be used for encoding secret
messages consisting of a sequence of i.i.d. equiprobable binary symbols using the
method described above. Then the sequence of symbols output by the stegosystem
obeys the same distribution µ as the input sequence.
The proof is easy to derive; it is given in [12]. It is also easy to see that
the same method can be used when the alphabet A is any partially ordered set.
The ordering can also be arbitrary, and can be known to the observer Eve. For
example, in the case when A is the set of all digital images, one can assume
length-lexicographical ordering on A.
3.1. The general construction
Next we describe the general construction of a universal stegosystem which
has the desired asymptotic properties for finite-memory sources of covertext.
The main idea is as follows. First, the given sequence of covertexts is divided
into blocks, say, of length n > 2k, where k is an upper bound of the memory
of the source µ of covertexts. For each block x = (x1, . . . , xn), Alice finds all
sequences of covertexts of lengths n that have the same probability as x and
also have the same k leading and k trailing symbols (the latter has to be done so
that the probability of the sequence of blocks as a whole is intact). Then Alice
enumerates all these sequences, and transmits the one whose number codes her
hidden text. To find the sequences that have the same probability as the given
one, this probability itself does not have to be known. Indeed, words that have
the same number of occurrence of all subwords of length k + 1 have the same
probability, for any k-order Markov distribution.
We now proceed with a more formal exposition.
Definition 3. A source (of covertexts) µ is called (stationary) k-order Markov,
if
µ(xn+1 = a|xn = an, xn−1 = an−1, . . . , x1 = a1)
= µ(xk+1 = a|xk = an, xk−1 = an−1, . . . , x1 = an−k+1)
for all n ∈ N and all a, a1, a2 . . . , an ∈ A.
As before, Alice needs to transmit a sequence y∗ = y1y2 . . . of secret binary
messages drawn by an i.i.d. source ω with equal probabilities of 0 and 1, while
a sequence of covertexts x∗ = x1x2 . . . drawn by an (unknown) source µ from
an alphabet A is available. It is known that µ has memory not greater than k,
where k > 0 is given. First we break the sequence x∗ into blocks of n symbols
each, where n > 1 is a parameter. Each block will be used to transmit several
symbols from y∗ (recall that in the simple stegosystem given in the beginning of
this section we had n = 2 and each block was used to transmit 1 or 0 symbols).
In this general case the following technical problem arises: the lengths of the
blocks of symbols from x∗ and from y∗ have to be aligned. The problem is that
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the probabilities of blocks from y∗ are divisible by powers of 2, which is not
necessarily the case with blocks from x∗.
Let u denote the first n symbols of x∗: u = x1 . . . xn (the first block), and
let νu(a1 . . . ak+1) be the number of occurrences of the subword a1 . . . ak+1 in
u. Define the set Su as the set of all words of length n in which the frequency
of each subword of length k + 1 is the same as in u, and whose first and last k
symbols are the same as in u:
Su =
{
v ∈ An :
∀s ∈ Ak+1 νv(s) = νu(s); ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , k, n− k + 1, . . . , n} vt = ut
}
. (3)
Elements of such sets, without the restriction on the first and last symbols, are
known as strings of the same type, see [3].
Observe that, if µ has memory not greater than k, then µ-probabilities of all
members of Su are equal. Let there be given some ordering on the set Su (for
example, lexicographical) which is known to all communicating parties, and let
Su = {s0, s1, . . . , s|Su|−1}
with respect to this ordering.
Denote m = ⌊log2|Su|⌋, where ⌊y⌋ stands for the largest integer not greater
than y. Consider the binary expansion of |Su|:
|Su| = (αm, αm−1, . . . , α0), (4)
where αm = 1, αj ∈ {0, 1} , m > j ≥ 0. In other words,
|Su| = 2
m + αm−12
m−1 + αm−22
m−2 + ...+ α0.
Denote δ(u) the index of the word u in the set Su (with respect to the
considered order) and let (λm, λm−1, . . . , λ0) be the binary expansion of δ(u).
Let j(u) be the largest number satisfying αj 6= λj . Alice, having found j(u),
reads j(u) letters from the source of hidden text y∗; let τ be the number whose
binary expansion is this sequence of letters. Alice finds the word v in Su whose
index is
∑
j(u)<s≤m αs2
s + τ and transmits v to Bob (in other words, v is the
output of the encoder).
The decoding is as follows. Bob, having received v, defines Sv (which equals
Su), then finds (in the same way as for encoding) the number j(v) (which is the
same for u and v: j(u) = j(v)) and τ , and then using τ he finds j(v) encoded
symbols.
All the subsequent n-letter words are encoded and decoded analogously.
Denote Stkn(A) the described stegosystem.
The k-order (conditional) Shannon entropy hm(µ) of a source µ is defined
as follows:
hm(µ) = −
∑
v∈Am
µ(v)
∑
a∈A
µ(a| v) log µ(a|v). (5)
8
Theorem 1. Suppose that an unknown k-order Markov source µ generates a
sequence of covertext taking values in some alphabet A, where k ≥ 0 is known.
Let this source be used for encoding secret messages consisting of a sequence of
i.i.d. equiprobable binary symbols using the described method Stkn(A) with n > 1.
Then
(i) the sequence of symbols output by the stegosystem obeys the same distri-
bution µ as the input sequence,
(ii) If the alphabet A is finite then the average number of hidden symbols per
letter Ln goes to the k-order Shannon entropy hk(µ) of the source µ as n
goes to infinity.
Proof. To prove (i) observe that if, as before, x1, x2 . . . denotes the sequence
generated by the source of covertexts, and X1, X2, . . . the transmitted sequence,
then by construction we have P (X1, . . . , Xn) = P (x1, . . . , xn) where n is the
length of the block. For the second block we have
P (Xn+1, . . . , X2n|X1, . . . , Xn) = P (Xn+1, . . . , X2n|Xn−k+1, . . . , Xn)
= P (Xn+1, . . . , X2n|xn−k+1, . . . , xn) = P (xn+1, . . . , x2n|xn−k+1, . . . , xn)
= P (xn+1, . . . , x2n|x1, . . . , xn),
where the first and the last equalities follow from the k-Markov property, the
second is by construction (the last k symbols of each block are kept intact),
and the third one holds because the hidden texts are equiprobable, as are the
elements of Su. The same holds for all the following blocks, thereby establishing
the equality of distributions (i).
Let S′u be the set of all strings of length n = |u| that have the same k-type
as u, that is, the same frequencies of subwords of length k: S′u = {v ∈ A
n : ∀s ∈
Ak+1 νv(s) = νu(s)}. In other words, S
′
u is the same as Su except the k first
and last symbols are not fixed. Using a result of the theory of types [3], for any
u for the size of the set S′u we have log |S
′
u| = nhk(Pu) + o(n), where hk(Pu)
is the k-th order entropy of the k-order Markov distribution Pu defined by the
empirical frequencies of the word u. Since the set Su is not more than a constant
times smaller than S′u we also have log |Su| = nhk(Pu) + o(n). Moreover, the
law of large numbers implies that hk(u)→ hk(µ) for µ-almost every sequence u
as its size n goes to infinity. Therefore,
log |Su| = nhk(µ) + o(n) with µ-probability 1. (6)
Furthermore, define ϕ := |Su|/2
m and let L(Su) be the average number of
secret bits transmitted per word from Su :
L(Su) =
1
|Su|
m∑
i=0
αii2
i.
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We have
L(Su) =
1
|Su|
m∑
i=0
iαi2
i =
1
|Su|
(
m
m∑
i=0
αi2
i −
m∑
i=0
αi2
i(m− i)
)
= m−
(
2m
m∑
k=0
kαm−k2
−k
)
> m− 2m+1/|Su| = m− 2/ϕ
= log |Su| − logϕ− 2/ϕ.
Computing the maximum, we find logϕ+2/ϕ ≤ 2 for ϕ ∈ [1, 2]. Thus, L(Su) >
log |Su| − 2. From this and (6) we obtain the second statement of the theorem.
As it was mentioned in the Introduction, the main idea of the stegosystem
St is to construct, for each given block of covertexts, a set Su of equiprobable
covertexts. The same idea was used in [12] to construct a stegosystem for
i.i.d. sources µ, with the main difference being in the definition of the sets Su.
In that work we have also obtained non-asymptotic estimates on the speed of
transmission of secret text. Such estimates should be also possible to obtain
for the case of k-order Markov sources, based on the results of the theory of
types (e.g., [3]), but, for the sake of simplicity, here we only consider asymptotic
behaviour of the speed of transmission.
3.2. Complexity of encoding and decoding
Consider the resource complexity of the stegosystem St0n(A), that is, the
general construction of the previous section, but for the case of i.i.d. sources
of covertexts. The only resource-demanding part of this stegosystem is finding
the rank of a given block u in the set Su of all its permutations, and, vice
versa, finding a block given its rank. (It is clear that all other operations can
be performed in linear time.)
Consider this computational problem in some detail. To store all possible
words from the set Su would require memory of order |A
′|nn log |A′| bits, (where
A′ ⊂ A is the set of all symbols that occur in u and n = |u|; without loss of
generality in the sequel we assume A = A′), which is practically unacceptable for
large n. However, there are algorithms for solving this problem with polynomial
resource complexity. The first such algorithm, that uses polynomial memory
with the time of calculation cn2, c > 0, per letter, was proposed in [7] (see also
[4, 14]). The time of calculation of the fastest known algorithm is O(log3 n), see
[9].
Next we briefly present the ideas behind the algorithm from [7]. Assume the
alphabet A is binary. Let S be the set of binary words of length n with w ones.
The main observation is the following equality, which gives the lexicographical
index number of any word v = x1 . . . xn ∈ S :
rank(x1 . . . xn) =
n∑
k=1
xk
(
n− k
w −
∑k−1
i=1 xi
)
, (7)
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where
(
t
m
)
= t!/(m!(t −m)!), 0! = 1 and
(
t
m
)
= 0 if t < m. The proof
of this well-known equality can be found, for example, in [5, 9]. As an example,
for n = 4, w = 2, v = 1010 we have
rank(1010) =
(
3
2
)
+
(
1
1
)
= 4.
The computation by (7) can be performed step-by-step based on the follow-
ing obvious identities:(
t
p
)
=
(
t− 1
p− 1
)
·
t
p
,
(
t
p
)
=
(
t− 1
p
)
·
t
t− p
.
A direct estimation of the number of multiplications and divisions gives poly-
nomial time of calculations by (7). The method of finding a word v based on
its rank, as well as a generalization to non-binary alphabets, are based on the
same equality (7); a detailed analysis can be found in [5, 9].
For the general case of k-order Markov sources of covertexts, again, the only
resource-demanding part of the stegosystem Stkn(A) is the enumeration of all
the sequences of the same type as a given one. For the case k = 1 and the
binary alphabet, [2] proposes an efficient algorithm for this problem. For k = 1
and arbitrary alphabet the recent work [19] gives a method (Lemma 13) of
performing such an enumeration in time O(n log3 log logn). (It is worth noting
that the work [19] is devoted to the problem of generating uniformly random
bits from a Markovian source of data, generalizing the von Neumann scheme,
which we have also used (Proposition 1) to construct a simple example of a
universal stegosystem. Thus the problem of steganography is closely related to
the problem of generating uniformly random bits from a non-uniform source
of randomness.) For the case k > 1, the problem of finding polynomial-time
algorithms, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, remains open. We conjecture
that efficient algorithms for this case exist as well, based on the results cited
above, and on the consideration that often the k-order Markov case can be
reduced to 1-order Markov by considering windows of size k as states.
4. Principled computational limitations on steganography
In this section we abandon all probabilistic assumptions on the source µ
of covertexts, and do not consider asymptotic behaviour of stegosystems with
respect to the sequence of covertext. Therefore, it will be convenient to consider
distributions of covertexts µ as distributions on An, where n is a parameter
interpreted as the total number of covertexts output by the source µ. In other
words, we have just one block of covertexts. (Clearly, if we show that it is
impossible (for some sources) to preserve the distribution of one block (the first
one), then it is also impossible to preserve the distribution of several consecutive
blocks, no matter what is the probabilistic dependence between them.) With
this exception, the rest of the protocol is as defined in Definition 1.
11
We next briefly introduce the notion of Kolmogorov complexity. A formal
definition can be found, for example, in [6]. Informally, Kolmogorov complexity
of a word s is the length of the shortest program that outputs s. That is, for
some universal Turing machine U , we can define the Kolmogorov complexity
KU (s) of a binary word s as the length of the shortest program for U that
outputs s. There are such machines U that KU (s) ≤ KU ′(s) + const for every
s and every other universal Turing machine U ′ (the constant may depend on
U and U ′ but not on s). Fix any such U and define Kolmogorov complexity
K(s) as KU (s). (So, we can say that Kolmogorov complexity is defined up to
an additive constant.) Complexity of other objects, such as sets of words or
programs, can be defined via simple encodings into words. We will use some
simple properties of K, such as K(s) ≤ |s| + c for any word s, whose proofs
can be found in e.g. [6]. Here it is worth noting that K(s) does not take into
account time or memory it takes to compute s.
Theorem 2. For every δ > 0 there is a family indexed by n ∈ N of distri-
butions Pn on A
n with h(Pn) ≥ n − 1, such that every stegosystem Stn whose
Kolmogorov complexity satisfies logK(Stn) = o(n) and whose speed of trans-
mission of hidden text Ln(Stn) is not less than δ, is not perfectly secure from
some n on.
Proof. The informal outline of the proof is as follows. We will construct a
sequence of sets Xn of words of length n whose Kolmogorov complexity is the
highest possible, namely 2Ω(n). For each n ∈ N, the distribution Pn is uniform
on Xn. We will then show that, in order to have the speed of transmission δ > 0
a perfectly secure stegosystem must be able to generate a large portion of the set
Xn, for each n. This will imply that the complexity of such a stegosystem has
to be 2Ω(n). The latter implication will be shown to follow from the fact that, in
order to transmit some information, a stegosystem must replace the input with
some output that could have been generated by the source; this, for perfectly
secure stegosystems, amounts to knowing at least a large portion of Xn.
Next we present a more formal proof. Fix n ∈ N and let X ⊂ An be any set
such that |X | = 2n−1 and
K(X) = 2n(1 + o(1)). (8)
The existence of such a set can be shown by a direct calculation of the number
of all subsets with 2n−1 elements; the maximal complexity is equal (up to a
constant) to the log of this value.
The distribution Pn is uniform onXn. Assume that there is a perfectly secure
stegosystem Stn for the family Pn, n ∈ N, and let the speed of transmission of
hidden text be not less than δ. Define the set Z as the set of those words which
are used as codewords Z := {x ∈ An : StDec(x) 6= Λ}. Since the expected
speed of transmission of hidden text is lower bounded by δ, we must have
|Z| ≥ δ2n−1 (indeed, since every word codes at most n − 1 bits, the expected
speed of transmission must satisfy (n − 1) |Z|2n−1 ≥ δn). Since St is perfectly
secure we must have Z ⊂ X . Furthermore, define Z0 as the set of words that
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code those secret messages that start with 0, and Z1 those that start with 1:
Zi := {x ∈ A
n : StDec(x) = iu, u ∈ {0, 1}∗}, i ∈ {0, 1}. (9)
Since Z = Z1 ∪ Z0 we must have |Zi| ≥ |Z|/2 ≥
δ
22
n−1 for some i ∈ {0, 1}. Let
this i be 1.
Thus, we have |X\Z1| ≤ 2
n−1(1 − δ2 ). Let us lower-bound the complexity
K(Z1|X\Z1) of the set Z1 given X\Z1. Given the description of X\Z1 and
the description of Z1 relative to X\Z1, one can reconstruct X . That is why
K(Z1|X\Z1) ≥ K(X)−K(X\Z1) +O(1). Hence,
K(Z1|X\Z1) ≥ K(X)− max
|U|≤2n−1(1−δ/2)
K(U) +O(1). (10)
The latter maximal complexity can be calculated as follows:
max
|U|≤2n−1(1−δ)
K(U) = log
(
2n
2n−1(1− δ/2)
)
+O(1).
Applying the Stirling approximation for factorial, we obtain
max
|U|≤2n−1(1−δ/2)
K(U) ≤ 2n(1− γ)(1 + o(1)),
where γ = 1− h(2−δ4 ,
2+δ
4 ). From this equality, (8), and (10) we get
K(Z1|X\Z1) ≥ γ2
n−1(1 + o(1)). (11)
We will next show how to obtain Z1 from X\Z1 and the stegosystem St, thus
arriving at a contradiction with the assumption that logK(St) = o(n).
For a set T ⊂ X define
ϕ(T ) := {StEnc(x, 1u) : x ∈ T, u ∈ {0, 1}n−1}.
Since St is perfectly secure, ϕ(T ) ⊂ X for every T ⊂ X . Let T0 = X\Z1, and
Tk = Tk−1 ∪ ϕ(Tk−1). Since X is finite and each Tk−1 is a subset of Tk, there
must be such k0 ∈ N that Tk = Tk0 for all k ≥ k0. There are two possibilities:
either Tk0 = X or X\Tk0 6= ∅. Assume the latter, and define Z
′
1 = X\Tk0.
Then to obtain an element of Z ′1 as an output of the stegosystem St, the input
must be an element of Z ′1 and a secret message that starts with 1. From this, and
from the fact that the distribution of the output is the same as the distribution
of the input (that is, St is perfectly secure), we get
Pn(Z
′
1) = Pn(Z
′
1, y = 1u) = Pn(Z
′
1)ω(1) = Pn(Z
′
1)/2,
which implies Pn(Z
′
1) = 0 and Z
′
1 = ∅. Therefore, there is a k ∈ N such that
Tk = X . This means that a description of Z1 can be obtained from a description
of X\Z1 = T0 and St. Indeed, to obtain Z1 it is sufficient to run StEnc on all
elements of T0 with all inputs starting with 1, thus obtaining T1, and then
repeat this procedure until we get Tk+1 = Tk for some k, wherefrom we know
that Tk = X and Z1 = Tk\T0. Thus,
K(Z1|X\Z1) ≤ K(St) +O(1) = 2
o(n) (12)
which contradicts (11).
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